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INTRODUCTION

The water resources of the State of Montana have never been
quantitatively determined. This uncertainty has posed no problems because the supply of water has been adequate to meet the
needs of the state. However, as more demands are placed on the
state's water resources, taking the citizens of Montana closer to the
day when there will be no surplus water, it is important that the
extent of Montana's water be defined and policies be established to
accomplish efficient use and protection of the resource so that adequate future supplies can be assured. The Montana Water Resources Act sets out the policy considerations to be addressed in
* Legal counsel for Montana Reserved Water Rights Commission; J.D., Lewis & Clark
College (1979); A.B., Middlebury College (1974).
The conclusions or opinions expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the State of Montana or the Department
of Natural Resources.
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formulating a state water plan. 1 Those considerations seek to promote the public interest, protect the water resources and coordinate plans of the various levels of government to secure the maximum social and economic prosperity for the citizens of Montana.
The demands being placed on Montana's finite water resources come from many quarters. Paramount among potentially
conflicting claims are those that may be asserted by interests
outside the state. The eventual uses which Montana might make of
its water resources could be foreclosed by demands of downstream
states or the federal government. The state water plan must recognize these competing claims and take into account the effect they
may have on development of the state's water resources.
The purpose of this article is to identify areas in which the
state's water rights might be subject to attack and review the legal
status of these areas of controversy. Such an analysis is intended to
give a general background and develop a legal awareness of the
processes involved. With such an understanding of the present legal system and the precedents established by it, a state water plan
can be designed to most effectively accommodate these competing
demands. It is recognized that the specifics of the water plan will
most likely necessitate further research in particular areas.
Potential competing claimants for Montana's water may be
broadly classified as: (1) other states, either in their own right or
representing their citizens; and (2) the federal government. Part
one of this article deals with the methods for resolving state-state
conflicts and the factors which are determinative. Part two deals
with the power the federal government may exert on Montana's
water. Part three deals with the methods and tools Montana may
use to protect its water resources from these external interests.
II.

INTERSTATE ALLOCATION

Disputes over the waters of interstate streams2 have been resolved by three different avenues. The first method used for interstate allocation of waters was the doctrine of equitable apportion1. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 85-1-101 (1979).
2. Disputes over interstate groundwater involve the same principles, though the application may be somewhat different due to hydrologic considerations. See Bittinger & Jones,
Management and Administration of Ground Water in Interstate Aquifers, Phase II (Report financed by U.S. Department of the Interior, authorized under Water Resources Research Act of 1964 (1974)); Fischer, Equitable Apportionment of Interstate Groundwaters,
21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 721 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Equitable Apportionment];
Fischer, Management of Interstate Ground Water, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 521 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Interstate Ground Water]; Pendley, Allocating Buried Treasure: Federal Litigation Involving Interstate Ground Water, 11 LAND & WATER L. REv. 103 (1976).
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ment. This doctrine is applied when states seek a solution to
interstate allocation in court. The second method for interstate
water allocation is a negotiated agreement or compact apportioning
the water under the authority of the Compact Clause of the United
States Constitution. 3 Only one interstate watershed in Montana,
the Yellowstone River Basin, is subject to an interstate compact.
The compact approach to resolving interstate water allocation
problems is "by far the most effective, most sound, most flexible,
and over-all most satisfactory ...
[but] [riegrettably, . . . it is
also the [least] likely."' The difficulty of obtaining the consent of
all the party-states and the federal government limits the use of
the compact. Finally, interstate waters may be allocated by congressional apportionment. The power of Congress to apportion waters of interstate streams among the states is demonstrated in the
dispute over the waters of the lower Colorado River. 5
A.

Equitable Apportionment

A suit for equitable apportionment of interstate water is often
brought by a state, under the doctrine of parens patria, as representative of all its citizens.6 The portion of water allocated to the
state under the proceeding will then be allocated intrastate to the
state's citizens, under the state's own water law.7 Each citizen of a
party-state is bound by the decree of the court in the interstate
action and each private water user may have no right in excess of
that allocated to his respective state.8
The forum for an equitable apportionment suit is the United
States Supreme Court. The United States Constitution grants
federal jurisdiction to "controversies between two or more states"
and original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases "in which a
State shall be a party." Thus, the Supreme Court shall act as a
trial court in controversies between states involving the allocation
of interstate waters. The Court, however, has been reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction unless the matter is one of "serious magniU.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Interstate Ground Water, supra note 2, at 546.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (litigated the Boulder Canyon Project
U.S.C. §§ 617 through 617t (1976)).
6. See 3 R. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHrs LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 66-75
(1911) [hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS). See also Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
3.
4.
5.
Act, 43
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tude." 10 In this situation the Court requires the state to bear a
greater burden than an individual would in showing that the equitable powers of the Court are required." The Court's reticence to
adjudicate such cases may be interpreted as a preference toward
the negotiated compact.
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights
of states in such cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such
disputes, they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present
complicated and delicate questions, and due to the possibility of
future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration
rather than a judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such
controversies may appropriately be composed by negotiation and
agreement."'
The Court's reluctance to deal with these issues is demonstrated
by the fact that only three of the suits for equitable apportionment
brought before the Supreme Court have actually resulted in decrees dividing the waters.' 8
There have been few cases involving equitable apportionment.
The doctrine has, however, evolved enough so that certain factors
and equitable principles can be deemed to be crucial to the Supreme Court. A review of three principal equitable apportionment
cases illustrates the development of those factors and principles.
The first formulation of the doctrine of equitable apportionment was set out in Kansas v. Colorado14 in 1907. That case involved a dispute over the waters of the Arkansas River which rises
in Colorado and flows easterly into Kansas. Kansas, which recognized riparian rights," asserted its right to the natural flow of the
stream. Colorado, recognizing appropriative rights"' but asserting
10. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.
496, 521 (1906).
11. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 (1943); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521
(1906).
12. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
13. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336
(1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
14. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
15. Riparian rights: The system of law dominant in Great Britain and the eastern
United States, in which owners of lands along the banks of a stream or waterbody have the
right to reasonable use of the waters and a correlative right protecting against unreasonable
use by others that substantially diminishes the quantity or quality of water. The right is
appurtenant to the land and does not depend on prior use. 7 R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER
RIGHTS § 310 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CLARK1.
16. Appropriative rights: The system of water law dominant in the western United
States under which (1) the right to water is acquired by diverting water and applying it to a
beneficial use, and (2) a right to water is superior to a similar right acquired later in time.
CLARK, supra note 15, at §§ 272-73.
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sovereign rights, contended it had a right to appropriate all the
waters of the stream for beneficial use.
Since the internal water law of each state had no common elements the Court applied equitable principles to give each state a
just and reasonable share. The apportionment took the form of a
division of the benefits received from the flow of the river rather
than a literal division of the waters.
We must consider the effect of what has been done upon the conditions in the respective states and so adjust the dispute upon the
basis of equality of right as to secure as far as possible to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without depriving Kansas of the
like beneficial effects of a flowing stream."
The Court enumerated no standards for evaluating which benefits
deserve the greatest protection. The case was dismissed since Kansas failed to show that Colorado's actions caused substantial injury.18 Thus the Court made no apportionment or division.
Some language in Kansas v. Colorado indicates that had the
substantive law of each state been similar; the Court might have
applied the common elements between the states.19 Wyoming v.
20
Colorado
demonstrates this common-element approach to equitable apportionment. Since both were prior appropriation states, the
Court held that application of the doctrine of priority between the
two states would, in that event, be equitable apportionment.2 ' In
allocating the waters of the Laramie River between Colorado and
Wyoming, the Court generally applied the rules of priority of the
appropriation across state boundaries. "Here the complaining state
is not seeking to impose a policy of her choosing on the other state,
but to have the common policy which each enforces within her limits applied in determining their relative rights in the interstate
stream. ' ' 22 Unfortunately, later equitable apportionments were not
so simply concluded.
In Nebraska v.Wyoming2 8 the party-states had similar alloca17. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 100.
18. Id. at 117-18. The Court dismissed the case without prejudice granting Kansas the
right to again apply for relief when it appeared that the substantial interests of Kansas were
being injured. However, even thirty-six years later the Court found that Kansas had failed
to show that "Colorado's use has materially increased, and that the increase has worked a
serious detriment to the substantial interests of Kansas." Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383,
400 (1943).
19. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 104-05.
20. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
21. Id. at 470.
22. Id. at 465.
23. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
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tion schemes. All three states involved, Colorado, Wyoming and
Nebraska, applied the doctrine of prior appropriation.24 The litigation involved allocation of the North Platte River among Colorado,
Wyoming, Nebraska and the United States. Several parties urged
that the doctrine of priority be applied interstate. Relying on Wyoming v. Colorado,the Court stated: "The cardinal rule of the doctrine is that priority of appropriation gives superiority of right. ''25
The Court continued:
Since Colorado, Wyoming and Nebraska are appropriation states,
that principle would seem to be equally applicable here. That
does not mean that there must be a literal application of the priority rule .... If an allocation between appropriation states is to

be just and equitable,
strict adherence to the priority rule may
26
not be possible.

The Court found priority to be a guiding principle but refused to
be bound by it if application of the principle would lead to undue
hardship.27 In this case, the Court sought to protect "established
uses" which may be the basis of the economy of a region.2 8 Relevant factors considered by the Court included
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in
several sections of the river, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas,
[and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits

to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed in the former.2 9
This enumeration of factors may be helpful in designing a
state water plan. Quite frequently the downstream states in a river
basin develop before the upper basin states. Thus, the downstream
uses have the more senior right under a strict priority scheme.
This list indicates that the Court is willing to consider factors in
addition to strict priority dates and that the Court will not halt or
curtail the economy of a region merely because it developed more
slowly. Since the headwaters of several drainages lie in Montana
this judicial stance is of particular importance to the state.
24. Nebraska originally was a riparian state but it later adopted the appropriation
doctrine as western, more arid areas of the state were settled. Riparian rights were preserved to a certain extent, that is they were still recognized but inferior to appropriative
rights. The Court considered Nebraska to be an appropriation doctrine state. 325 U.S. at
599-600.
25. Id. at 617-18.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 622.
28. Id. at 618.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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In Nebraska v. Wyoming the Court considered the degree of
dependence and reliance a region places on its water supply. The
Court did not place any restrictions upon water used for "ordinary
and usual domestic and municipal purposes and consumption..."
and declared that "nothing in the recommended decree is intended
to or will interfere with such diversions and uses."30 The Court was
unwilling to require that the established use of water for domestic
purposes be abated, even if such uses were junior to other uses
according to priority of appropriation. Such a holding involving domestic water use is easy to accept. However, deciding the relative
importance of other established uses is more difficult and the answer less clear.
First, what constitutes an "established use"? The Court has
not defined established uses with any specificity. The Court does,
however, specifically address the economy of a region as a factor to
be considered: "The economy of a region may have been established on the basis of junior appropriations. So far as possible
those established uses should be protected though strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them."3 1 Montana, for
example, whose economy is largely based on agriculture made possible only through irrigation, would not necessarily, by virtue of its
more junior water rights, have its water supply terminated because
of more senior downstream out-of-state appropriators. This treatment by the Court actually results in a softening of the appropriative scheme of water rights where the water supply crosses a state
line.
It must be remembered that interstate water rights are not adjudicated on an individual basis. A share would be allocated to
each state and that state would administer its portion under its
own state water law. In Montana that law is based on strict priority of appropriation. Thus, the more junior rights holders mentioned above who were able to win against a more senior out-ofstate appropriator could have their water cut off by a more senior
upstream in-state appropriator.
A state water plan that mirrors the factors enumerated by the
Court provides the greatest opportunity to protect the state waters
from out-of-state interests in an action for equitable apportionment. A state policy therefore should favor those uses on which
local or regional economies depend. Established uses should be encouraged. Those uses would certainly encompass agriculture in an
30. Id. at 656.
31.

Id. at 618.
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agrarian economy, and might also include in-stream reservations in
an area dependent on recreation, fishing and hunting.
It is dubious if prospective uses designated in a state water
plan could be considered as established uses. However, since an
action for equitable apportionment is an action in equity the Court
may consider all relevant factors. The list set out in Nebraska v.
Wyoming was intended by the Court to be merely illustrative, "not
an exhaustive catalog." 2 Thus, it seems likely that the Court
would give consideration to prospective uses included in a state
water plan, but the weight to be given to those uses is uncertain.
B. Interstate Compacts
1. Formation and Effect
The Supreme Court and Congress have both expressed a preference for interstate compacts as the vehicle for resolving interstate water allocation problems." The use of a compact is superior
to the equitable apportionment process in several ways. First, a
compact provides certainty and a framework for dealing with the
complicated questions of interstate allocation of water. Increased
certainty stimulates development because it lowers the risk that
water on which an enterprise is dependent might be lost. Second, a
compact provides increased flexibility. It can provide for the possibility of future change of conditions. Judicial resolutions are limited to the controversy at hand. The court cannot issue a judgment
regarding prospective uses nor can it formulate a plan to deal with
future changes. Any change in a judicial decree requires the time
and expense of further adjudications. Third, a compact can provide for expert administration. The judiciary is ill-equipped to deal
with the technical issues involved in interstate water management.
The negotiators of a compact usually are persons with knowledge
and expertise in the physical management of water. They can better design a fair and efficient program for apportioning interstate
waters.
The Compact Clause of the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall, without the consent of Congress . . .enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . ."8" This
provision has been interpreted to apply to any agreement between
states "directed to the formation of any combination of states
32. Id.
33. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943); Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43
U.S.C. § 617c (1976).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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tending to increase political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States. 3 5 This language has not provided an avenue to avoid congressional consent for compacts allocating waters between western
states. All compacts entered to date have required the consent of
Congress.
The federal role in compacts may extend beyond the approval
required by Congress. Often, Congress gives consent to negotiate
though it is not required. Since ultimate federal approval is required, keeping Congress apprised of the developments during the
negotiation helps to speed approval when the compact is submitted to Congress. Usually the federal government sends a negotiator
to participate in formulation of the compact.
A federal representative may also be involved in the administration of the compact. Under the Yellowstone River Compact a
federal official is appointed to the Yellowstone River Compact
Commission by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The
official, however, votes only if the other members of the Commission are unable to decide." During the ratification of the Yellowstone River Compact some objection was raised concerning the authority of the USGS rather than the president to appoint the
federal representative. 7 However, since an additional function of
that official is to assist with technical data, it seems appropriate
that the official be appointed by the USGS. After a compact has
been. negotiated it is sent to the state legislatures for ratification.
The consent of Congress is sought after the respective state legislatures have ratified the compact. The compact then usually becomes a statute of each state and also federal law.
The status of the interstate compact as law is unusual. It is as
equally binding as any adjudication, equitable apportionment or
decree by the Supreme Court. Its validity does not depend on an
enforcing judicial order. A compact is essentially a treaty between
two sovereigns. The consent of Congress removes the constitutional restriction on the sovereignty of the states and restores them
to the status of sovereign powers capable of enacting a treaty. 8
This restoration of sovereign power raises questions as to the
legal status of the compact in relation to state law. Some commen35. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). See also Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Agreements; When is a Compact Not a Compact, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63
(1965).
36. MCA § 85-20-101 (1979) (Yellowstone River Compact, art. III).
37. H.R. Doc. No. 319, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 370 (1968).
38. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 883, 894 (1838); Poole v. Fleeger,
12 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1981

9

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 42 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 4

[Vol. 42

tators contend that the vehicle of the interstate compact permits
the states to exercise powers in excess of those normally available
to them. It might then follow that the compact, as quasi-treaty,
would be supreme to state law. Indeed, in some instances this
proves to be the case. 9 The same result occurs if the compact is
considered a federal statute, by virtue of the consent of Congress,
thus prevailing over state law by the Supremacy Clause. 40 Similarly, the compact, also a state act, repeals by implication the conflicting older state law.
The extent to which a compact might override a provision of a
state constitution has been the subject of several cases.41 While
none of the cases actually hold that an interstate compact is superior to the state constitutional provisions, the cases indicate that if
no other grounds for the decision were feasible, the Supreme Court
could find that such provisions must fall.42
In Dyer v. Sims4 ' a compact to control pollution on the Ohio
River entered into by West Virginia and eight other states was at
issue. The auditor for West Virginia refused to pay out the monies
necessary to run the compact commission because he felt that the
compact violated a debt limitation provision in the West Virginia
Constitution. The West Virginia Supreme Court supported the auditor's position, but the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The ground for reversal was not the supremacy of the compact
over the state constitution. Instead the Court held that the two
instruments were not in conflict thus departing from the traditional rule that the state supreme court is the final interpreter of
the state constitution. Apparently where an interstate compact was
involved, the United States Supreme Court was not willing to let
the state supreme court's interpretation of the state constitution
invalidate the compact:
It requires no elaborate argument to reject the suggestion that an
agreement solemnly entered into between States by those who
alone have political authority to speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified, or given final meaning by an organ of one of the
contracting States. A State cannot be its own ultimate judge in a
39. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). The Supreme Court declared a state
law unconstitutional on the ground that it impaired the obligation of a compact between
different states of the Union.
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
41. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Dyer v. Sims,
341 U.S. 22 (1951); Delaware River Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419 (1939); Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
42. See Interstate Ground Water, supra note 2, at 535.
43. 341 U.S. 22 (1951).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/4

10

1981]

STATE WATER PLAN
Ladd: State Water Plan

controversy with a sister State.4 '

The same result was obtained in Hinderlider v. La Plata River
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,"5 a similar case involving Colorado and
New Mexico. The La Plata River Compact apportioned interstate
waters between Colorado and New Mexico. The ditch company
had an adjudicated water right to 391/2 cfs.from the stream. When
the stream flow became low, the state engineers from the respective states established a formula for the most efficient use of the
water which called for rotating the whole supply of water between
Colorado and New Mexico users on a ten-day cycle. Colorado's
constitution provides, "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied."4 The ditch company had claimed that it was being deprived
of its vested property rights guaranteed by the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld that position. 7 The
United States Supreme Court, not surprisingly, reversed. Again,
clearly the effect of the ruling was that the provisions of the interstate compact would override the state constitution. The Court
found, however, that no property right was taken. The ditch company's right was valid in Colorado, but only to the extent of Colorado's share of the water. "[T]he Colorado decree could not confer
upon the Ditch Company rights in excess of Colorado's share of
the water of the stream; and its share was only an equitable portion thereof. ' 48 Thus, barring any "vitiating infirmity" in execution
of the compact, "[t]he Compact [could] not have taken from the
'49
Ditch Company any vested right.
The same case also illustrates the way a compact may affect
previously established private rights. In spite of the ruling of the
Court, the water right that the ditch company held by an 1898 Colorado court decree was diminished by the La Plata Compact of
1925. Even though the Court held that no vested property right
was taken, private rights were in fact adversely affected by the
compact. One suggestion to deal with this problem is that a state
consider compensating owners for the water rights which will be
impaired by the compact.8 0
44. Id. at 28.
45. 304 U.S. 92, 102 (1938).
46. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
47. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 25 P.2d 187
(1933).
48. Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 102.
49. Id. at 108.
50. HUTCHINS, supra note 6, at 86. The effect of such compensation would be two-fold.
First, those holders of state water rights which are diminished by the terms of the compact

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1981

11

278

REVIEW
LAW
MONTANA
Montana
Law Review, Vol.
42 [1981],
Iss. 2, Art. 4

[Vol. 42

The effect of the cases discussed above is that the terms of a
compact will be enforced in spite of state statutes or constitutional
provisions. To date, however, the Supreme Court has been able to
avoid a holding directly on this point.
2. Jurisdictionto Hear Compact Disputes
Closely associated with the question of the federal law status
of a compact is the jurisdictional issue. As mentioned earlier in the
section on equitable apportionment, the United States Supreme
Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in actions between
two or more states. 51 The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction,
though not exclusive, over actions by a state against the citizens of
another state.52 However, if a state is not a party, there must be
another basis for jurisdiction if a compact dispute is to be heard in
federal court.
Such jurisdiction must be established under the federal question provision, which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States.5 8
For original federal jurisdiction to exist under section 1331, the
plaintiff must show a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States to be an essential element of the
cause of action." If the gravamen of the complaint requires the
interpretation of a federal law, then such construction of the law
forms an essential element of the cause of action. 5 Thus, if it can
be established that an interstate compact is a federal law and the
cause of action requires construction of the compact, then original
federal jurisdiction will be established.
A line of cases following Delaware River Commission v. Colburns5 makes it clear that the construction of an interstate compact is a federal question. In Colburn, the Supreme Court found
that "by the sanction of Congress, [the compact] has become a law
would be compensated for their loss. Second, the added cost to the state of such compensation would cause the state to seek offsetting benefits in the terms of the compact, and thus
figure prominently in the negotiation of the compact.
51.
52.

U.S. CONsT. art. III,

§ 2.

Id.
53. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C. §
1331(a) (1976); eliminates requirement that amount in controversy exceed $10,000).
54. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936).
55. League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 507 F.2d 517, 519 (9th
Cir. 1974).
56. 310 U.S. 419 (1940).
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of the Union.""7 In League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional
PlanningAgency 8Othe Ninth Circuit held that a case involving the
construction of an interstate compact which requires a judicial determination of the nature and scope of obligations set forth therein
"arises" under the laws of the United States within the meaning of
section 1331(a). Thus, federal district courts will have original jurisdiction over matters involving the interpretation of interstate
compacts.
The original jurisdiction of the federal district court in interstate compact matters is not necessarily exclusive of state authority to hear the question. Some compacts provide by their terms
that all questions are to be resolved in federal court. 59 However,
where the compact contains no such special provision federal jurisdiction will be found concurrent with that of the state. 60
In all cases involving interstate compacts the United States
Supreme Court remains the final arbiter. As discussed earlier, the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction when one of the parties is
a state. When the controversy involves private litigants the Supreme Court will have certiorari jurisdiction. Review may be
sought "(3) by writ of certiorari, . . . where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of a commission held under, the United
States."6 1 Certiorari jurisdiction does not require that the federal
question form an essential element of the complaint. However, the
record in the state court must establish that a federal question
exists.6 2
3.

Cancellation or Amendment

A typical provision written into the text of many interstate
compacts reserves the right of the United States to alter, amend or
replace the compact. The Yellowstone River Compact contains
such language.6 3 However, that provision also states, "This reservation shall not be construed to prevent the vesting of rights to the
use of water pursuant to applicable law and no alteration, amend57. Id. at 427.
58. 507 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1974).
59. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
60. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Utah Int'l v. Intake Water Co., 484 F. Supp. 36
(D. Mont. 1979).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
62. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Delaware River Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419
(1939).
63. Yellowstone River Compact, 655 Stat. 671 (1951).
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shall be held to affect rights so vested." 4

Amendment by signatory states or the federal government requires
that any changes be made by the same procedure as approval of
the original compact.
Termination of a compact requires unanimous consent of all
the signatory states. Several times parties have sought to void a
compact through the courts of one of the states. In Sims,

65

the

auditor of West Virginia sought to void an interstate compact because it purportedly violated the West Virginia Constitution. The
Supreme Court ruled that unilateral nullification of an interstate
compact is not possible by a signatory state. 6 Thus, while a state
court may interpret an interstate compact, any such decision will
be subject to review in the federal courts.
4.

The Yellowstone River Compact

The Yellowstone River Compact 67 was entered into by North
Dakota, Wyoming and Montana in 1950 with the intent to promote
interstate comity and remove all causes of present and future controversy between the states and their citizens with respect to the
waters of the Yellowstone River and its tributaries. The compact
establishes a commission to administer the compact between Wyoming and Montana.6 8 No commission was deemed necessary to administer the compact between Montana and North Dakota. The
Yellowstone River Compact Commission is comprised of one member from Montana and one from Wyoming, to be appointed by the
respective governors, and one federal representative to be appointed by the director of the USGS." The federal representative
votes only if the other commissioners fall to agree. T°
The compact recognizes all appropriate rights to the beneficial
use of the waters of the Yellowstone River system existing as of
January 1, 1950, and such supplemental supplies as are necessary
for those rights.7 1 The unused and unappropriated waters of the
Yellowstone and its interstate tributaries are allocated between
Montana and Wyoming on a percentage basis. The provision relating to the division of the waters between Montana and North
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
Sims, 341 U.S. at 28.
65 Stat. 663 (1951); MCA § 85-20-101 (1979) (Yellowstone River Compact).
MCA § 85-20-101 (1979) (Yellowstone River Compact, art. III, § A).
Id.
Id. (art. III, § F).
Id. (art. V).
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Dakota recognizes all rights to waters of the Yellowstone below
Intake, Montana, existing on January 1, 1950.72 Those rights are
unaffected by the terms of the compact. During the summer
months, the waters are divided between the two states on a proportionate basis of the acreage irrigated. Tributaries wholly within
one state which flow into the Yellowstone below Intake, Montana,
are allocated to the respective states in which they are situated.
Domestic and stockwatering uses are excluded from the compact
altogether, provided that no stockwatering reservoirs have a capacity exceeding 20 acre-feet.7 8
The compact allots the percentages of each of the interstate
tributaries between Wyoming and Montana. The mechanics of this
allocation are not difficult. However, the provisions are slightly
ambiguous as to what waters are subject to this percentage allocation. At the outset, the compact recognizes those rights in existence as of January 1, 1950, and "such quantity of that water as
shall be necessary to provide supplemental water supplies" for
those rights.7 ' The compact does not define those supplemental
supplies nor indicate how they are to be determined. The section
which sets out which water is subject to the percentage allocations
provides:
The quantity to which the percentage factors shall be applied
through a given date in any water year shall be, in acre-feet, equal
to the algebraic sum of:
a. the total diversions, in acre-feet above the point of measurement, for irrigation, municipal and industrial uses in Wyoming and Montana developed after January 1, 1950, during the
period from October 1 to that given date;
b. the net change in storage, in acre-feet in all reservoirs in
Wyoming and Montana above the point of measurement completed subsequent to January 1, 1950, during the period from October 1 to that given date;
c. the net change in storage, in acre-feet, in existing reservoirs in Wyoming and Montana above the point of measurement,
which is used for irrigation, municipal, and industrial purposes
developed after January 1, 1950, during the period October 1 to

that given date;
d. the quantity of water, in acre-feet that passed the point of
measurement in75the stream during the period from October 1 to
that given date.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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The ambiguities lie in the words "developed" and "completed."
Under Wyoming and Montana statutes it is possible that a right
may have a priority date prior to January 1, 1950, but that actual
use was made after that date. 76 It is uncertain whether this water
should be subject to the percentage allocations because it is unclear on what date that use was "developed." The problem is much
the same with the word "completed."
Federal and Indian water rights, discussed at length below, are
not affected by the terms of the compact. Any water used by the
federal government for projects constructed after the date of the
compact are charged to the share of the state where the use is
made.7
The Yellowstone Compact also contains a provision prohibiting trans-basin diversions without the unanimous consent of all the
signatory states.78 This provision is important in view of the coal
development in southeastern Montana and northeastern Wyoming.
Many of the coal deposits lie outside the Yellowstone Basin. It is
unclear whether consent of the commission would be sufficient or
whether consent of the state legislatures would be necessary. Montana and Wyoming both maintain that such consent requires approval of the legislatures of their respective states. North Dakota,
which has no representative on the commission, would only require
consent of the North Dakota State Water Commission.79 There is
no established procedure for obtaining consent for inter-basin
transfers.
Similar statutes in Montana and Wyoming prohibit exportation of the state's waters outside its boundary without the consent
of the legislature.80 The relationship of this statute to the similar
compact provision has not been resolved. It seems likely that the
older state statute would be repealed by implication with the passage of the compact. Both the Montana statute and the compact
trans-basin diversion prohibition are the subject of a pending
suit.81 The case seeks to have both provisions declared unconstitutional because they discriminate against and unreasonably burden
interstate commerce. An additional objection is that the compact
provision violates the 14th Amendment because it allows appropriators in basins other than the Yellowstone to make trans-basin di76. MCA § 85-2-401 (1979); WYo. STAT. § 41-4-512 (1977).
77. MCA § 85-20-101 (1979) (Yellowstone River Compact, art. VII, § D).
78. Id. (art X).
79. Yellowstone River Compact Commission 27th Annual Report, 1978.
80. MCA § 85-1-121 (1979); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-105 (1977).
81. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n No. 1184, (D. Mont.,
filed June, 1973, amended complaint filed Oct., 1980).
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version without the consent of the signatory states while appropriators in the Yellowstone Basin are prohibited from making transbasin diversions without such approval. The case has been indefinitely postponed while the matter is pursued through the Yellowstone River Compact Commission.
The Yellowstone River Compact has been in effect nearly 30
years and to date its terms have not required enforcement. It is
doubtful if that state of affairs can continue for long. As enforcement becomes necessary, litigation will result. That litigation
should provide the answers to the ambiguities mentioned and further define the details of the administration of the Yellowstone
River Compact.
C.

CongressionalApportionment

Prior to the decision of Arizona v. California2 in 1963, there
were only two methods for allocating the waters of interstate
streams among the states. In that case the Supreme Court announced the third method of interstate allocation-apportionment
by Congress. The Boulder Canyon Project Act,8 which is interpreted in Arizona v. California, is the first and only such congressional apportionment. A bit of background on the apportioning of
the Colorado River may be helpful to understanding the process.
There had been numerous attempts to formulate a compact
among the seven states of the Colorado River drainage. Finally, a
compromise suggested by Herbert Hoover was agreed upon. That
compromise, the Colorado River Compact,84 does not allocate the
waters on a state by state basis, rather it divides the waters of the
85
Colorado River between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin states.
This agreement allayed the fears of the Upper Basin states that
the faster developing Lower Basin states, California in particular,
might appropriate nearly all the flow of the Colorado River and
thereby deprive the Upper Basin states of the water necessary for
their development. The agreement divided the 15 million acre-feet
annual flow of the Colorado equally between the two basins. The
water was to be measured at Lee's Ferry in Northern Arizona.
The Colorado River Compact made no decision as to the share
each state was to receive. At the Denver Governors' Conference in
1927, the Lower Basin states attempted unsuccessfully to agree on
82. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
83. 43 U.S.C.!§§ 617 through 617t (1976).
84. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928). Text appears at 70 CONG. REc. 324 (1928).
85. The Upper Basin States are: Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. The
Lower Basin states are Arizona, Nevada and California.
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a division. They were, however, able to come within 400,000 acrefeet of solution.86 In the simplest terms, since the states could not
agree among themselves, Congress decided on the apportionment
and forced it upon the states through the Boulder Canyon Project
Act.
Construction of the Boulder (now Hoover) Dam was essential
for the development of the arid Southwest. The Boulder Canyon
Project Act authorized construction of the dam only upon the occurrence of one of two contingencies: (1) if all seven states ratified
the Colorado River Compact, or (2) if ratification had not occurred
within six months of December 21, 1928, then six states including
California must ratify the compact and.

.

. California must irrevo-

cably and unconditionally covenant with the remaining six states
and the United States to limit its use to 4.4 million acre-feet out of
the 7.5 million acre-feet allocated to the Lower Basin states.8 7 Arizona refused to ratify the compact because it would not protect
Arizona from California priorities. However, California did pass a
statute limiting its share of the water to 4.4 million acre-feet."
Construction was authorized under the second option.
The Boulder Canyon Project Act also authorized the Lower
Basin states to enter into an agreement which would apportion the
waters of the Colorado among them. Such a compact was not approved. Since there was not unanimous ratification, there was no
actual Lower Basin Compact. The allocation of the water was accomplished nonetheless by a provision in the Boulder Canyon Project Act. Section 589 of the act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to make contracts for the storage and delivery of the water to
the users in the three states. Such contracts were a prerequisite to
receiving waters from the project. 90 The secretary was required to
make contracts which allocated the waters in accordance with the
Lower Basin Compact which was authorized but never entered
into. 91

In discussing this apportionment, the Supreme Court has
stated:
[T]he Act invited Arizona, California, and Nevada to adopt a
compact dividing the waters along the identical lines that had
86. They could agree to: California 4.6 mil. acre-feet; Arizona 3.0 mil. acre-feet;
Nevada 0.3 mil. acre-feet. The Colorado River Compact only made 7.5 mil. acre-feet available to the three Lower Basin states.
87. 43 U.S.C. § 617c (1976).
88. 1929 CAL. STATS. ch. 16.
89. 43 U.S.C. § 617d (1976).

90. Id.
91.

43 U.S.C. § 6171 (1976).
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formed the basis for the Congressional discussions of the Act:
4,400,000 acre-feet to California, 300,000 to Nevada and 2,800,000
to Arizona. Section 8(b) gave the states power to agree upon some
other division, which would have to be approved by Congress.
Congress made sure, however, that if the sthtes did not agree on
any compact the objects of the Act would be carriedout, for the
Secretary would then proceed, by making contracts, to apportion
water among the states ....11
Thus, the doctrine of congressional apportionment was created.
The Supreme Court did not explain the basis for this new
form of apportionment. In announcing the new doctrine the Court
stated:
In this case, we have decided that Congress has provided its own
method for allocating among the Lower Basin States the mainstream water to which they are entitled under the compact.
Where Congress has so exercised its constitutional power over
waters, courts have no power to substitute their own notions of an
"equitable apportionment" for the apportionment chosen by,
Congress.93

There is no elaboration of which constitutional power is the source
of congressional apportionment. Presumably it is based on the
broad federal power over navigable waters." This power is derived
through an expanding and "highly fictional" construction of the
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power "to regulate
commerce . . . among the several states."95 The special master in
Arizona v. California also had no doubt about the source of
authority:
Clearly the United States may construct a dam and impound the
water of the Colorado River, a navigable stream .... Clearly,
also, once the United States impounds the water and thereby obtains physical custody of it, the United States may control the
allocation and use of unappropriated waters so impounded."
92. 373 U.S. 546, 579 (1963) (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
94. However, in an earlier case involving the same dispute the Court stated: "As the
river is navigable and the means which the Act provides are not unrelated to the control of
navigation, the erection and maintenance of such dam and reservoir are clearly within the
powers conferred upon Congress." Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455-56 (1930) (citations omitted).
95. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737 (1950).
96. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See also Report of Special Master
Rifkind at 160 (1960). The report of the Special Master, Simon H. Rifkind, in Arizona v.
California is dated December 5, 1960, and was received by the Supreme Court on January
16, 1961. 364 U.S. 940 (1961).
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Indeed, the navigation power is broadly construed. It will be discussed further in the section on federal-state authority.
Whether the power of Congress to allocate interstate waters is
limited to navigable waters is unclear. Most likely it is not. The
navigation power has been found to extend upstream from navigable streams to non-navigable tributaries.9 7 In addition, congressional apportionment of non-navigable waters may be justified
under the Property Clause.
A final source of power for congressional apportionment involving the Colorado River, an international river, is the Treaty
Power. The United States and Mexico signed a treaty in 194498
guaranteeing a 1.5 million acre-feet flow of the Colorado River at
the border. Congress has the power to do those acts necessary to
honor the treaty.
D. Interstate Allocation and the Montana State Water Plan
The three methods of allocating the waters of interstate
streams set out above-equitable apportionment, interstate compact and congressional apportionment-establish the legal framework upon which a state water plan may be designed for Montana.
A state water plan should develop policies which would result in
favorable treatment for Montana and its residents when a conflict
is to be resolved by one of these avenues. Unfortunately, the standards used to resolve interstate conflicts are often vague and hard
to quantify.
Equitable apportionment has been referred to as an attempt
to allocate interstate water in the most inefficient manner. While
inefficiency is not necessarily the result of an equitable apportionment suit, the judicial process does not decide interstate water
cases on the basis of economic maximization of benefits. Instead it
deals with "equality of right" to benefits of the flow of the stream.
The factors to be considered in evaluating the right to the benefits
are quite vague but include: physical and climatic conditions, consumptive use in each section of river, return flows, storage capabilities and the extent of established uses. In short, nearly everything
relevant to the situation becomes a factor in the decision. It is difficult to incorporate such an all-inclusive list of factors into a state
water plan. The one factor that seems to be most important to the
Court is "established uses." However, the Montana Water Use Act
97.
98.

Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
59 Stat. 1219 (1945).
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of 1973 already emphasizes the importance of "existing uses." 99 It
is doubtful that a water plan could do much more.
Equitable apportionment overall is a poor way for a state to
resolve its interstate water conflicts. The court cannot effectively
digest the mountains of technical data which such a proceeding
generates. A decree from the court can only deal with those conflicts which have already arisen. It may not be prospective or provide relief in situations that will result in conflicts in the future. In
addition, resolution of interstate water disputes in court takes
many years. During that time water rights are poorly defined.
Equitable apportionment is usually a last resort as a result of continued inaction of the states involved to reach a negotiated
settlement.
To date, there have only been three actions for equitable apportionment which resulted in decrees actually apportioning interstate waters. Perhaps this brings out the greatest value of equitable apportionment, which is that it poses a threat which may
provide the states involved with increased incentive to reach a better solution.
Such a solution might be an interstate compact. The compacting process has several advantages over a judicial solution. First,
the compact may be prospective in nature. It can deal with
problems that have yet to arise. Unlike a judicial order, it may apportion unappropriated waters. Second, a compact is worked out
by the states themselves rather than by a third party. However,
the most significant impediment to the compact process is the difficulty in securing agreement among the parties. The process also
may be time consuming.
In a compact negotiation, Montana's bargaining position appears strong. For most of the river systems in the state, Montana is
the upstream state. This means that the burden of bringing a suit
for equitable apportionment would be on the other or downstream
party. Even when such a suit is brought, the Supreme Court has
shown reluctance to exercise its power unless the harm suffered is
of serious magnitude and must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. 10 0 When the Court refuses to hear a suit, the upstream
state is allowed to continue *the use which the downstream state
sought to enjoin, hence, the system favors the upstream state.
Since Montana enjoys the advantage of being the upstream state
and is less developed with fewer established uses and more un99. MCA § 85-1-101(5) (1979).
100. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
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appropriated water than downstream states, the preferable method
for resolving interstate water allocation problems is through interstate compacts. Such agreements could secure the greatest benefits
for the state for present and future water uses.
Congressional apportionment has been used to allocate interstate waters only once - the Boulder Canyon Project Act discussed earlier. One commentator attempts to demonstrate that
congressional apportionment is the best method by arguing that
congressional apportionment is in fact a form of compact likely to
obtain as satisfactory a division as an actual compact or adjudication.10 1 That may be true from a federal standpoint. However, from
a state's perspective it seems less desirable. Congressional apportionment bypasses the state legislatures thus depriving them of
their veto power and denying them input into the allocational process. The most important role of congressional apportionment, in
view of the fact that the power has been singularly exercised, is the
threat that it may be exercised. During the debate in Congress
over the Boulder Canyon Project Act, one senator summed up the
act by saying that, if the states do not agree on a formula, Congress will provide them with one. This may be a powerful incentive
for states to agree upon the terms of a compact.
There is a situation developing that could lead to the exercise
of congressional power to apportion interstate waters including
possibly Montana. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Commerce to "study the depletion of the natural resources of those regions of the States of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Texas and Nebraska presently utilizing the declining water resources of the Ogallala aquifer, and to develop a plan to increase
One of the methods being exwater supplies in the area. . .. ,,1o0
amined is exportation of water from other states to recharge the
Ogallala aquifer. The secretary is to formulate a plan and make
recommendations for further congressional action. The. High Plains
Study Council has issued a resolution reassuring states such as
Montana which may be the source of the water, that present uses
and future needs of the exporting states will be considered as having prior rights to any waters involved. Only those waters in excess
of the present and future requirements are to be considered available for exportation. The resolution also promises to recognize existing compacts and contracts as well as instream flow requirements. In fact, the resolution tries to convey to potential exporting
101.
102.

Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1, 46-58 (1966).
42 U.S.C. § 1962d-18 (1976).
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states that all their requirements, present and future, will be satisfied before any water is exported. It is hard to believe that exportation of Montana's waters would not at some point limit the future uses of that water in Montana.

III.

CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL POWER

Federal rights in water pose a potentially serious conflict in
the management of Montana's water. While Montana may deal
with other states on an equal footing, its bargaining position when
dealing with the federal government is not as strong. The bases for
states' claims to the waters within their boundaries are several congressional acts and admission to the Union. The history of the development of western water law has shown a "consistent thread of
purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress."10 3 However, the power of the federal government over the
states' water remains enormous. Many cases involving a clash between state and federal rights over waters are matters of deciding
0
the intent of Congress rather than its power.14
This section of the article discusses the basic origins of the
power of the states and the federal government over waters and
streams, then analyzes several specific areas of importance to Montana. These areas are: (1) federal and Indian reserved rights; (2)
federal water projects and reclamation law; and (3) non-reserved
rights.
The federal government exerts most of its power over water
through the Commerce Clause which provides Congress with the
power "to regulate commerce . . . among the several states."' 0 In
an early construction of this clause the Court found navigation to
be included in commerce.""a This gave rise to the power to regulate
navigation.1 07 Interpretation of the Commerce Clause continued to
be flexible and encompassed a widening sphere. Dean Frank
Trelease has said:
Although the Supreme Court itself has termed its constructions
"strained" and "highly fictional," commerce has been held to include transportation, which in turn includes navigation; the
power to regulate navigation comprehends the control of navigable waters for the purposes of improving navigation; this power to
control includes the power to destroy the navigable capacity by
103.
104.
105.

106.
107.

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
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damming the waters to protect adjacent lands from flood. The
power to obstruct leads to the power to generate electric energy
from the dammed water. Congress can protect the navigable capacity of water by preventing diversions or obstructions, and the
power to prevent obstruction leads on to powers to license
obstructions."0 8
Federal power under the Commerce Clause is not limited by the
navigability of a stream. The federal government may control nonnavigable streams to assure proper supplies of water to maintain
navigability farther downstream or to prevent flooding.1 09 The federal power under the Commerce Clause has become so broad there
are few areas it does not reach.
In exercising its navigation power, Congress does not need to
compensate private persons for an interest in navigable waters. 11 0
Such interests are held subject to the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. All land affected by navigable waters is subject
to this navigation servitude.
If the federal government cannot maintain its authority under
the navigation power it may do so under the Property Clause.
"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." ' The power established under the
Property Clause has been found to be sufficient to override the objections of state officials and inconsistent state law." 2
Congress may also exercise control over water resources under
the spending power,'" the war power," 4 and the treaty power. 115
These sources of power form the basis for the federal government's
power over water. That power is plenary. In fact, most cases do not
involve the power of Congress to pass the legislation in question,
108. Trelease, Arizona v. California:Allocation of Water Resources to People, States
and Nation, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 158, 177.
109. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
110. United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1954). In the Rivers and
Harbors Flood Control Act of 1970 (33 U.S.C. § 595a (1976)), Congress has provided that
compensation be paid for real property taken above the normal high water mark. This property shall be valued by its best and highest use. The statute addresses only real property not
water rights.
111.

U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 3.

112. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); First Iowa Hydro-Elec.
Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
.113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737
(1950). See also 2 CLARK, supra note 15, at § 103..
114. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). See 2 CLARK,
supra note 15, at § 104.
115. See Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); 2 CLARK,
supra note 15, at § 105. See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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but rather they are concerned with the intent of Congress in enacting the law.11
A.

Federal Reserved Rights: The Winters Doctrine

The development in the pattern of land ownership in the West
set the stage for the Winters doctrine. Settlers and miners, encouraged by the land acts, were pouring into the West in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. The system which evolved for allocation of water grew out of local customs and practices. The appropriation doctrine granted water rights to the first person to put the
water to beneficial use.
The federal government owned nearly all the land in the West
but initially did little to set up regulations for its use or disposal or
for the application of the waters found on those lands. With the
Act of 1866,117 Congress recognized the system of customs and
practices which had developed on the public lands prior to that
date. The federal government did not establish any system of
water rights but merely recognized the already existing system and
the private rights created by it. 1"8 The Act of 1866 and its subsequent amendment in 1870119 made it clear that the United States
and its grantees would respect the private water rights acquired
under local customs, state or territorial laws or court decisions.
Shortly thereafter, in 1877, Congress passed the Desert Land
120
Act which freed for appropriation all unused water on the public
domain. All unappropriated water on public lands was to "remain
and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for
irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing
rights."1" The Desert Land Act did not address what rights, if any,
were retained by the federal government.
The reserved rights doctrine is a judicial creation which has
been developed over the last seventy years. It was originally announced in Winters v. United States122 in 1908. The Court in
Winters found that the government had the power to "reserve
12
waters and exempt them from appropriation under state laws

and that the government had exercised that power, by implication,
116. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978).
117. 14 Stat. 251-(1866).
118. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459 (1879).
119. 14 Stat. 251, as amended 16 Stat. 217 (1870).
120. 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976)).
121. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaverhead Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
160 (1935).
122. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
123. Id. at 577.
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to reserve water rights for the Indians on the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation in Montana."" In that case, the Gros Ventre and
Assiniboine tribes ceded most of their land to the United States,
reserving a small portion designated as the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation. " ' The treaty contemplated that the Indians would
change their habits from those of a "nomadic and uncivilized people . . . to become a pastoral and civilized people. 12 6 Without
water for irrigation, the smaller parcel of land, to which the Indians were now confined, would be valueless. The Court refused to
find that the Indians intended to give up their rights to the water
that was necessary to their survival on the reservation and held
instead that the government had reserved the waters for Indian
use.

12 7

The actual basis of the reserved water right is not clear from
the Winters case.128 It may be argued that the Indians reserved the
water when they ceded the lands.2 9 This would give them a priority dating from the time they settled the lands. The theory that
the Indians reserved the rights, while attractive for reservations
created by treaties, might leave reservations created by executive
order or statute, such as the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, "
without reserved water rights. However, the reservation doctrine
has developed to imply reservation of water rights whether the reservation is created by treaty, statute or executive order.' The majority of the cases since Winters support the view that the government reserved the water rights for the benefit of the Indians. " '
Under this reasoning, the priority date would be the date of the
establishment of the reservation.
124. Id.
125. 25 Stat. 113 (1888).
126. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
127. Id.
128. The constitutional basis for federal authority to reserve water rights lies in the
Property Clause, Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause. The power of the government to reserve waters has never been doubted. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577
(1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
129. Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights for the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 631, 645-49 (1971). The Rio Grande pueblos never were a part of the
public domain nor has any treaty, statute or executive order ever designated those lands as
Indian reservations. Indians of the pueblos claim "aboriginal" rights based on use and diversion before the lands were acquired by the United States. See State of New Mexico v.
Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 112 (1977). See also Morrison, Comments on Indian Water Rights, 41 MONT. L. REV. 40, 54-55 (1980).
130. The Northern Cheyenne Reservation was created by executive order by President
Chester A. Arthur in 1884 and enlarged by an executive order in 1900.
131. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
132. E.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Walker River Irr.
Dist., 204 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
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The amount of water reserved under the Winters doctrine is
enough to satisfy the present and future needs of the Indians.133
The Winters doctrine reserves an open-ended amount of water in
comtemplation of the Indians' increasing water needs as their agricultural skills develop. 1 " It is the future reservation which wreaks
havoc on the efficient use of water in the West. The appropriation
system provides certainty which encourages development and investment. Water which is subject to future use on reserved lands
cannot be safely relied upon by non-Indian users. The inchoate Indian rights may be asserted whenever they are needed. The resulting uncertainty discourages long-term investment and favors inefficient short-term uses which can be discontinued with minimal loss
when and if the needs for the reserved water increases.
Since the water right is reserved for future uses it is a right
that, unlike normal appropriative rights, cannot be lost through
abandonment or adverse possession. In addition, the right has a
date of priority which is the same as the date of the reservation. In
most cases this yields a senior water right.
The quantity of water reserved depends on the purpose of the
reservation.I" In Cappaert v. United States' the Supreme Court
held that Congress impliedly reserved "only that amount of water
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more.'

37

In

the case where reservations were created to transform the Indians
into a "pastoral and civilized" people, agriculture is usually the
purpose of the reservation.13 8 The document creating the reservation may indicate the purpose of the reservation. 39
In Arizona v. California,4 0 where the purpose of the reservation was to allow the Indians to develop an agricultural economy,
the quantity of water reserved was based on the number of irrigable acres in the reservation."4 1 Water sufficient to irrigate that
acreage was held to be reserved for the Indians. The special master
addressed the purpose of the reservation:
The reservations of water were made for the purpose of enabling
133. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 597.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 600-01.
136. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). Cappaert involved the reserved water rights of the Devil's
Hole National Monument, a federal non-Indian reservation.
137. Id. at 141.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908).
140. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
141. Id.
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the Indians to develop a viable agricultural economy; other uses,
such as those for industry, which might consume substantially
more water than agricultural uses, were not contemplated at the
time the Reservations were created . . . . I hold only that the
amount of water reserved, and hence the magnitude of the water
rights created, is determined by agricultural and related requirements, since when the water was reserved that was the purpose of
the reservation. . .. The measurement used in defining the magnitude of the water rights is the amount of water necessary for
agricultural and related purposes because this was the initial purpose of the reservations .... "4
It is certain that where the purpose of the reservation was to
allow the Indians to develop an agricultural economy, the amount
of water reserved is determined by the number of irrigable acres
and the amount of water required per acre. The treaty, executive
order or legislation creating most Indian reservations recite an agricultural purpose, if they address purpose with any specificity at
all.
A problem arises when a tribe wishes to make use of reserved
waters for a use not contemplated when the reservation was created. There are three possible approaches to this situation. First, a
strict interpretation of the Winters doctrine would hold that water
was impliedly reserved only for the narrow primary purpose contemplated at the time the reservation was created. Second, the
original purpose of the reservation may establish the quantity of
water reserved, but that amount of water may then be applied to
other uses not foreseen at the time the reservation was created. 4 8
Third, the purpose of a reservation might be more flexibly construed as permitting the Indians to establish a viable economy on
the reservation based on agriculture or any other feasible use of
the land. This would entitle the tribe to a reserved water right sufficient to make full use of the land including uses such as industry
and natural resource extraction which were not foreseen when the
reservation was created.
Recently the Supreme Court has begun to limit the expansive
nature of the reserved rights doctrine. The case of United States v.
New Mexico1 44 held that, for non-Indian federal reservations, the
amount of water reserved was only that quantity sufficient to fulfill
the primary purpose of the reservation. The Court refused to find
142. Report of Special Master Rifkind at 232-33 (1960); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963).
143. This approach was adopted in the supplemental decree to Arizona v. California,
439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979).
144. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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that waters had been reserved for secondary or supplemental
purposes.
United States v. New Mexico dealt with the implied reservation of waters in the Gila National Forest in New Mexico. The
Winters doctrine, which initially applied to Indian reservations,
had previously been expanded to apply to all federal reserved
lands, including national forests, national parks, monuments and
military reservations. 145 During a general adjudication of the
waters of the Rio Mimbres River, the United States asserted its
reserved right to waters of the Rio Mimbres for use in the Gila
National Forest. The United States claimed that sufficient water
had been impliedly reserved to preserve the timber in the forest,
secure favorable water flows and for "minimum instream flows for
aesthetic, recreational and fish-preservation purposes. '"146
The Gila National Forest was reserved in 1899 under provisions of the Organic Act of 1897 which "intended national forests
to be reserved for only two purposes-to conserve the water flows
47
and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the people."'
The United States' claim to water for instream uses for aesthetic,
recreational and fish purposes was based in part on language in the
Multiple Use Management Act of 1960.148 The Multiple Use Act
broadened the purposes for which national forests were to be managed to include "outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed and
wildlife and fish purposes. ' 9 However, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the Supreme Court of New Mexico. "The
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 does not have a retroactive effect nor can it broaden the purposes for which the Gila National Forest was established under the Organic Act of 1897."150
Continuing, the Supreme Court stated, "While we conclude that
the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 was intended to
broaden the purposes for which national forests had been previously administered, we agree that Congress did not intend to
thereby expand the reserved rights of the United States."' 5 1
In this case, the Supreme Court restricted the reserved water
rights to only those purposes set out in the legislation creating the
reservation. It allowed reserved rights only for those purposes con145. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See also Randquist, The Winters
Doctrine, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 639.
146. 438 U.S. at 705.
147. Id. at 707.
148. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976).
149. Id.
150. 438 U.S. at 713.
151. Id.
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templated at the time the reservation was created. While United
States v. New Mexico deals with a non-Indian reservation, it is
reasonable that this restrictive interpretation may be expanded to
lands reserved for Indians. Each aspect of the Winters doctrine
has eventually been expanded to treat similarly all federal reservations, both Indian and non-Indian.""' If such a view of reserved
rights is applied to Indian reservations it seems likely that reserved
waters will not be available for coal development or other uses not
contemplated when the reservation was established. While extending the logic of New Mexico may lead to a conclusion that
Indian reserved rights be limited to the purposes originally contemplated, such a result is far from certain. More than one commentator has questioned the precedential effect of New Mexico.
Throughout the West, United States v. New Mexico will be read,
along with California v. United States, as a major victory for
state control of western waters. On one level, this reading is right
and the cases are a welcome relief from the Supreme Court's simplistic preference for federal control of water resources development. Nevertheless, advocates of state control can take little
heart from New Mexico because the case is too flawed and hence
unstable to have a long term influence. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will reverse itself on the narrow issue of the effect of
the 1891 and 1897 acts, but it is by no means certain that the
broad dicta and attitudes which run through the opinion will
prove a reliable guide to future reserved rights controversies.5 3
Currently pending in Montana are several related cases which
deal with Indian reserved water rights for industrial and energy
development. The Northern Cheyenne Tribe has filed a suit in federal court seeking adjudication of their water rights on the Tongue
River. 1 4 In an associated case the United States filed suit in its
fiduciary capacity for the Northern Cheyenne and Crow Indians,
and in its own right to determine water rights in the Tongue River
and Rosebud Creek.158 In both actions the tribes and/or the United
States assert priority as of the date of the treaties and executive
orders establishing the reservations. The tribes claim all waters
152.

The nature of the reserved right on Indian lands differs, however. The right is

held in trust by the United States. Thus a fiduciary relationship binds the United States'
actions regarding Indian reserved rights.
153. Fairfax & Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A Critical Analysis of United
States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. Rav. 509, 554 (1978-79).

154. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n, No. CV-75-6-Blg.
(D. Mont., filed Aug. 14, 1975).
155. United States v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n, No. CV-75-20-Blg. (D. Mont.,
filed Aug. 1, 1975).
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which were unappropriated at the time of the treaties and executive orders "which are or will become reasonably necessary for the
present and future needs of the Indians in fulfillment of the purposes for which the reservation was created. Such purposes include
municipal and domestic use, irrigation and stock watering and full
utilization of the reservation and its resources . .. .,16
The tribes also assert an aboriginal right of the waters in, on
and adjacent to the reservation. 157 Aboriginal rights stem from the
tribal use of the water from time immemorial. The tribal council of
the Northern Cheyenne Reservation formally adopted a resolution
claiming
the first, paramount and aboriginal right ... to the appropriation, use and storage of all . . .waters (on or under the reserva-

tion) for the purpose of the use of said waters including, but not
limited to domestic use, irrigation, manufacturing, development
of natural resources and development of recreation projects and
other facilities. 58
While coal mining and power plant projects are not directly involved in these cases, it is clear that the specter of energy development prompted the suits. The results in these cases are anxiously
awaited. They will be landmark decisions. Both cases have been
dismissed from the federal district court and are currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals." 9
Important to the resolution of both Indian and non-Indian reserved rights is the McCarran Amendment, passed in 1950.160 This

act waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for purposes of adjudication of federal water rights. Subsequent decisions
interpreted the McCarran Amendment to allow the United States
to be joined in an action, involving federal non-Indian reserved
rights.' e' Before the landmark decision in United States v. District
Court for Eagle County, 6 ' in 1971, the United States could only
be joined if (1) there had first been a complete adjudication of the
156. Id. Plaintiff's amended complaint, filed Aug. 14, 1975 (emphasis added).
157. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit, No. CV-75-BIg. (D. Mont., filed Aug. 14,
1975); United States v. Big Horn Low Line Canal, No. CV-75-34-BIg. (D. Mont., filed Aug.
29, 1975). Both of these cases were dismissed, along with five others, on jurisdictional
grounds. All are on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Northern Cheyenne Reservation v. Tongue
River Water Users Ass'n., 484 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mont. 1979).
158. Resolution No. 179 (74) of the Tribal Council of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, Lame Deer, Montana (March 25, 1974).
159. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n., 484 F. Supp. 31
(D. Mont. 1979).
160. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
161. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
162. Id.
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stream, and (2) the federal rights sought to be determined were
acquired under state law. The second requirement excluded reserved rights since they are exempt from state law. The decision in
Eagle County allowed adjudication of non-Indian federal reserved
rights in state court when the state court provided a comprehensive system for adjudicating water rights. Soon after Eagle County,
the Supreme Court held that the McCarran Amendment allowed
adjudication of Indian reserved rights and that state courts had
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to hear such
cases."' 3 These developments were necessary so that federal reserved rights could be quantified.
The reserved rights doctrine is a major obstacle to formulation
of a state water plan for several reasons. Reserved rights need not
comply with state law. The state has been nearly powerless to regulate use of those waters. The jurisdiction gained by the state
courts under the McCarran Amendment is the only control the
state has over reserved rights.164
The priority of reserved rights also causes problems. Reserved
water rights have priority dating from the date the land was reserved. Whether the water has actually been put to beneficial use
is unimportant. The right cannot be lost through disuse and may
be asserted at any time. Since most of the reservations were created prior to the turn of the century the reserved water rights accompanying them are senior.
The most difficult problem regarding the implications of reserved rights on a state water plan lies in quantification. The
amount of water reserved with each reservation is unascertained.
The process of quantification involves several steps. First, the purpose of the reservation must be determined. In the instance of Indian reservations it is especially difficult to determine the purpose.
In light of United States v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court is apt
to interpret the purpose narrowly, but it is a tenable argument
that the Indian reservations were created to allow the tribes to
make a reasonable living on the land, which could include energy
development. Then, once the purpose has been determined the
amount of water necessary to fulfill that purpose must be quantified. Where the purpose of the reservation is agricultural, the
quantity of water reserved has been based on the number of irrigable acres contained on the reservation. If the purpose is non-agricultural, standards have yet to be established for quantity.
163.
164.

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Id.
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The most damaging aspect about the unquantified reserved
rights is the uncertainty it creates. That uncertainty translates into
risk for ranchers, farmers and other water users. Water which is
subject to future use on reserved lands cannot be safely relied
upon. The resulting uncertainty discourages long-term investment
and makes it difficult to acquire capital. The uncertainty favors
inefficient short-term investment so that the loss will not be so
great if the reserved rights are exercised.
At present, there is no recourse. If the exercise of federal reserved rights causes any holders of state water permits to lose their
water, no damages or compensation will be paid. Unless a water
user has a priority more senior than the date of the reservation he
loses. Numerous pieces of legislation have been proposed which
would provide compensation but none have been adopted. Some
legislation in this area is needed but as the general counsel to the
state engineer's office in New Mexico stated:
A legislative solution to the problem is attractive. However, I
think that something is to be learned from the repeated failure of
the Congress to make any progress. It may be that the courts will
have to shorten the distance between the competing federal and
state interests before there's a chance of passing any meaningful
legislation. 115
Montana is attempting to resolve the problem of reserved
rights through negotiation rather than litigation. The state legislature in 1979 established the Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission. 166 The Compact Commission is authorized to conduct negotiations with several Indian tribes and the federal government to
conclude a compact for the equitable division and apportionment
of water affected by the reserved rights doctrine. Former President
Carter in his water policy message of June 1978 endorsed resolution of the problem by negotiation. To date, negotiations, have begun with three tribes, the Northern Cheyenne, the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes and the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes
of the Fort Peck Reservation. Negotiations are also underway with
the federal agencies of the Departments of Interior and
Agriculture.
The state water plan should address the problems enumerated
in this section. Of course, Montana cannot unilaterally design a so165. Letter from Richard A. Simms, General Counsel, State Engineer Office, State of
New Mexico (June 15, 1978), reproduced in Comptroller's Report on the Status of Undetermined Federal and Indian Reserved Water Rights, Appendix V. Report #CED-78-176
(1978).
166. MCA § 2-15-212 (1979).
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lution for the conflict with federal reserved rights, but the state
water plan should call for quantification of federal reserved rights
and compensation to individuals who may lose water rights perfected under state law.
B. Federal Water Projects: Reclamation Law
The history of cooperation between states and the federal government has been smooth until recent times. The states have been
anxious to have the federal monies to develop their water resources
and therefore have been accomodating rather than assertive in
their positions. In fact, it was nearly half a century after the enactment of the Reclamation Act 16 7 before the state-federal aspects of
the law were litigated. 168 Until at least 1950, the federal government voluntarily sought water rights under the appropriate state
provisions and the states automatically granted the federal
permits.
Most of the present controversy focuses on the provisions of
section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902.169 Its general tenor and

sometimes its exact language has been incorporated into nearly all
legislation authorizing the construction of federal projects. 17 0 Section 8 defines the relationship of state and federal interests. It recognizes and preserves state authority over water. Under this section, the Secretary of the Interior is required to "proceed in
conformity" with state laws in carrying out federal water
projects. 1 '
The first case concerning section 8 was United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co. 17 2 In that case, landowners downstream of the

Friant Dam in California sought compensation for loss of a portion
167. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
168. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
169. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
170. E.g., Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1976); Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43
U.S.C. § 617 (1976).
171. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in
any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control,
appropriation, use or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested rights
acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein
shall in any way affect any right of any state or of the Federal Government or of
any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream
or the waters thereof: Provided, that the right to the use of water acquired under
the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial
use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right.
43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
172. 339 U.S. 728 (1950).
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of their riparian rights. After construction of the dam their lands
were no longer flooded and enriched by the spring floods. The
United States defended on the basis that the dam was constructed
under the navigation power and that the damage was thus noncompensable. As mentioned earlier, if a federal project bears some
positive relation to navigation then the government need not compensate owners for loss of riparian rights. The theory of this navigation servitude is that the United States holds an easement over
all properties which might affect or be affected by navigation.
The rights for which the plaintiffs sought compensation were
recognized under state law. The Court held that the federal government had constructed the dam mainly for reclamation, not navigation and therefore compensation must be paid for the plaintiffs'
lost property interests. 173 The Court required that state law be
used to define what constituted a compensable property interest
and that such interests
could only be taken under the power of
17 4
eminent domain.

In Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken,'7 section 5 of
the Reclamation Act,16 which limits a landowner's use of federal
project waters to 160 acres, was challenged. The plaintiff argued
that section 8 required state law to control distribution of the waters and that under California water law he was entitled to more
water for his land. The Court held that the general provisions of
section 8 did not override the specific directives of section 5.177 The
opinion contained, as dicta, language that a state could not impose
conditions on federal distribution of water." 8
More California litigation continued to erode the effect of section 8. The city of Fresno sought to enjoin the federal government
from filling the Friant Dam 179 because impoundment of the water
would threaten the city's water supply. Fresno claimed that section
8 required that the California state law giving priority to municipal
uses be respected. The Supreme Court disagreed:
[Section] 8 does not mean that state law may operate to prevent
the United States from exercising the power of eminent domain
to acquire the water rights of others. This was settled in Ivanhoe
IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken....

Rather, the effect of [sec-

tion] 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the definition of the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 737.
Id. at 739.
357 U.S. 275 (1958).
43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
McCracken, 357 U.S. at 292.
Id. at 295.
City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
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property interests, if any, for which compensation must be
made.18

The decision in City of Fresno v. California' secured the proprietary theory, which relegates state law to the narrow role of determining whether a certain water right is a property interest.
Arizona v. California,1 82 discussed above for its interstate aspects, also contributes to the definition of section 8. The Boulder
Canyon Project Act incorporated section 8 by reference in section
14.183 In addition, section 18 had similar language preserving the
states' authority.'" The federal government claimed not only the
right to apportion the waters of the Colorado River among the
states but also the authority to distribute the water within each
state. This claim was based on section 5 which authorized the secretary to make contracts with individual water users.8 5 In reasoning similar to that employed in Ivanhoe, the Supreme Court found
that the more specific provisions of section 5 overrode the general
reservation of state authority contained in sections 14 and 18.
State law would be applied only as far as it was not inconsistent
with the federal legislation. Again, state law was limited to defining
compensable property interests.
The most recent case, and a departure from the trend, is
California v. United States.186 This litigation involved the New
Melones Dam in California which was authorized by the Flood
Control Acts of 1944 and 1962.187 The dam would flood 13 miles of
the Stanislaus River southeast of Sacramento, including a stretch
of white water important for its recreational value. The California
Water Resources Control Board (CWRCB) approved the application of the Bureau of Reclamation for the unappropriated waters
in the river. However, the CWRCB found that no plan for use of
the waters had been developed and that the Bureau of Reclamation had no firm committments from water users. Therefore, approval was given subject to 25 conditions. 188 The most important of
the conditions prohibited impounding any of the water until a specific plan for the use of the water was formulated.
180. Id. at 630.
181. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
182. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
183. 43 U.S.C. § 617m (1976).
184. 43 U.S.C. § 617q (1976).
185. 43 U.S.C. § 617d (1976). See text accompanying notes 89-91, supra.Section 5 was
the exclusive method for obtaining water from the project.
.186. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
187. 58 Stat. 901 (1944); 76 Stat. 1191 (1962).
188. California Water Resources Control Board, Dec. No. 1422 (April 1973).
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The United States sought relief in federal district court.""'
The federal government argued that it need not apply for a state
water permit, but if in the interest of comity the government did
apply, then California was required to approve the request as long
as unappropriated water was available. California maintained that
it could impose any necessary conditions on the government's application as long as they were not inconsistent with congressional
directives. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the United States, holding that the federal government must
make an application for a permit but as long as unappropriated
water was available, California could not deny or condition the
permit.1 90 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that
decision. 19 1
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state may impose
conditions on a federal project as long as those conditions are not
inconsistent with congressional directives. 192 Since the lower courts
did not reach the question of whether an inconsistency existed, the
case was remanded for findings on that point. The Court based its
holding primarily on legislative history of the 1902 Reclamation
Act. The debate in Congress made clear the intent that state law
control both the appropriation of water rights in federal projects
and the distribution of the water.
The holding in California v. United States"3 will undoubtedly
give the state a more central role in the planning and operation of
federal projects. It is important to remember, however, that the
decision results from an interpretation of congressional intent not
power. In the dissent, Justice White notes, "[O]f course, the matter
is purely statutory and Congress could easily put an end to our
feuding. . . ...
I Congress could at any time choose to further exercise the power it has or to restrict or terminate the policy of deference to state law. State interests that conflict with federal purposes will not be respected. For these reasons it is important for
the states to consider methods which may protect against or control the federal power rather than dealing only with the will of
Congress in each individual statute.
Since the states' role in defining compensable property interests is secure, the key to protecting Montana's water interests lies
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
Id. at 901-02.
California v. United States, 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 654 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 695.
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in this area. The state law should define property interests in
water rights as broadly as possible. This cannot prevent the exercise of federal power, but it does require that compensation be
paid for a taking of those interests. Broad definition of property
rights in water benefits the state in two ways. First, it reduces the
amount of unappropriated water available. Second, it assures that
state concerns will be taken into account in federal projects because a taking of water rights defined by state law to be property
rights would require compensation.
The most secure property right which a state can recognize is
a duly perfected appropriative right. It cannot be taken except by
legal process.19 5 Montana has already extended recognition to future and instream uses through the reservation process.'" As yet
there is no case law confirming that a reservation would constitute
a property right for purposes of the Fifth Amendment taking
clause. As long as the process is not utilized in an indiscriminate
fashion it appears that a reservation will be found to be a property
right. This is discussed further below.
The reservation process allows Montana to exert a claim on
the water. If such a claim is a compensable property right, the
state will have great leverage in dealing with the United States.
Federal projects can only be authorized where the benefits exceed
the costs.19 7 Thus, all proposals must undergo cost-benefit analysis.
The cost of acquiring reserved water without Montana's consent
may push the cost higher than the benefit, thus prohibiting the
project. Even if benefits still outweigh costs and the federal government proceeds with the project, the state will have forced the
federal government to pay for the full cost of the project. Indirectly, those who do benefit from the project will be forced to pay
the true cost of the water through higher rates.'" If Montana's
best interests will be served by a federal project which requires the
use of reservation waters, the reservation may be modified to allow
the federal government to take the water cost free." Thus, as long
as a reservation of water can be shown to be a compensable property right, the reservation process can offer great leverage and flexibility in protecting the state's interests.
It must be noted that if the United States can justify the pro195. Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 103 Mont. 284, 62 P.2d 206 (1936).
196. MCA § 85-2-316 (1979).
197. 32 U.S.C. § 485h (1976). A congressional directive can, of course, override this
section.
198. 43 U.S.C. §§ 485 through 485h (1976) requires that charges made for project
water repay the costs of the project.
199. MCA § 85-2-316(10) (1979).
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ject under the navigation power, then, under the theory of the navigable servitude, property owners will not be compensated. The
Court has shown a willingness to interpret this power broadly. In
fact, many projects which mainly benefit irrigation have been allowed to use the no compensation rule of the navigable servitude.
It seems quite clear that the navigable servitude should only apply
to that portion of a multi-purpose project that actually does benefit navigation. The court has been willing to so restrict the navigable servitude only where the Bureau of Reclamation administers
the project.20 0 This rule should be extended to all projects regardless of the administering agency.
The history of federal water legislation clearly demonstrates a
pattern of deference toward state law. However, Congress is vested
with practically complete power to regulate the use of water within
each state. While the tradition of congressional cooperation is comforting, the states need to take steps to assure their input should
that spirit of cooperation fade. Increasing the recognition of property rights in the state's water may protect Montana's interests.
C.

Non-Reserved FederalRights

In response to former President Carter's 1978 water policy
statement, the solicitor general formulated an opinion outlining his
position on federal water rights.'0 " In that opinion the theory of
non-reserved rights is asserted. The opinion maintains that the
federal government never granted away its right to make use of
unappropriated waters on public lands and as a result the United
States may vest in itself water rights in unappropriated waters independent of state law.102 Unfortunately, in announcing this position, the opinion seems to muddle the issues of federal constitutional power and the exercise of that power and also the
distinctions between reserved rights and the new non-reserved
rights theory.
The opinion states that non-reserved rights do not derive from
any reservation of the land, but instead are available for any "congressionally-sanctioned" purpose on federal lands. The right arises
out of appropriation of the water by the United States and carries
a priority date as of the date of appropriation. The right may be
consumptive or non-consumptive. Its extent is limited by "[tihe
200. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). The Bureau of Reclamation has been renamed the Water and Power Resource Service (WPRS).
201. Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914, U.S. Dept. of Interior (June 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Solicitor's Opinion].
202. Id. at 9-11.
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time of its actual initiation and the purpose and quantity of
203
use."
The basis for such a theory has its origins in the nineteenth
century acts briefly discussed in the reserved rights section above.
A brief summary will be helpful here. The Act of 1866 and its 1870
amendment 2 " recognized the appropriation doctrine as it had already developed in the mining camps of the West. The Desert
Land Act of 1877205 freed for appropriation the water on the public
lands. The act provided that
all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and
use together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources
of supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain
and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for
irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing
rights.2 0
The solicitor's opinion interprets the Desert Land Act to mean
that only the amount of water actually appropriated after the passage of the Desert Land Act from streams on the public lands was
severed from the land. He argues that the federal government retained a proprietary interest in any waters not appropriated under
state law. 7 Thus, in putting those waters to use, the opinion continues, the federal government need not comply with state law.
This conclusion does not seem to square with the case law. In
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement2 08 the Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of the Desert Land Act: "If
this language is to be given its natural meaning . . . it effected a
severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself.' '2 0 9 This severance of the water
from the land freed the water for appropriation under the laws of
the state.2 10 The Desert Land Act kept the United States out of
the business of water regulation, leaving water law and its application to the states. 1
The recent cases of United States v. New Mexico2 1 2 and Cali203. Id. at 15.
204. 14 Stat. 253 (1866), as amended by 16 Stat. 218 (1870), 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
205. 19 Stat. 377 (1877), 43 U.S.C. §§ 321 et. seq. (1976).

206. Id. at § 321.
207. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 201, at 16.
208. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
209. Id. at 158.
210. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907).
211. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922); California v. United States,
438 U.S. 645 (1978).
212. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/4

40

PLAN
WATER
STATE
Ladd: State
Water Plan

1981]

fornia v. United States21 3 illustrate the proper role of the states in
water regulation. In Californiav. United States the Court referred
to United States v. Rio Grande Dam & IrrigationCo. 214 and noted

that there are only two limitations to a state's exclusive control of
its streams-reserved rights and the navigation servitude.2 1 5 Ex-

cept in these two instances "the state has total authority over its
internal waters."2 1

In United States v. New Mexico the Court

found that the United States had reserved water for the Gila National Forest to fulfill the specific purposes of that reservation but
"[w]here water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States
would acquire water 2in
the same manner as any other public or
17
private appropriator.

The solicitor does cite United States v. New Mexico as support for his theory, but the passage quoted notes that Congress
never intended to relinquish its authority to reserve unappropriated water.2 1 8 That point is indisputable, but it lends no support to

a theory of non-reserved rights. The opinion seems to further confuse reserved and non-reserved rights when it quotes Cappaert v.
United States for the proposition that "[flederal water rights are
not dependent upon state law or state procedures ....."19 Cap-

paert involved reserved rights in groundwater and the passage
quoted must be read in context. It is referring to federal reserved
rights, which are exempt from state law.
There can be no argument about the existence of federal
power to reserve waters or to acquire water without compliance
with state law. However, that power must be exercised in order to
be effective. This requires a constitutionally enacted statute.220
The solicitor appears to argue that "legislation enacted by Congress to accomplish management objectives on federal lands" 2 1 is
such a statute. Even if that is the case, the logic of California v.
213. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
214. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
215. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 662.
216. Id.
217. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added).
218. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 201, at 9.
219. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 134 cited in Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 201, at 17.
220. The solicitor quoted the National Water Commission: "Federal Agencies [can
make] some water uses that neither comply with State law nor can be justified under the

reservation doctrine. The power of Federal Agencies to make such uses cannot be denied
under the Supremacy Clause, if the water has been taken through the exercise of constitutional power." Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 201, at 16 (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 16-17.
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United States222 dictates that state water law would be preempted
only where inconsistent with the congressional directives. Insofar
as the state law does not conflict with those legislative purposes
the federal government must comply with state law. This seems to
be at odds with the solicitor's opinion that the federal government
may vest rights in itself "independent of the substantive state
law." The solicitor seems to presume that, lacking a specific clause
preserving states' rights, the federal government need not comply
with state law. Dicta from the Supreme Court, however, seems to
presume that the federal government must comply with state law
except where there is expression of congressional intent otherwise.
There are no cases directly on point. The solicitor correctly
states that an opinion in this area must be the result of interpreting conflicting dicta.2 23 Nor are there apt to be many cases involving this non-reserved federal right if the federal agencies cooperate
with the states.224 The solicitor's opinion does direct interior agencies to make applications to the state and conform with procedural
law. The effect of this directive is uncertain. Federal agencies conforming only with state water law procedure would not fit into the
appropriative water rights scheme. The system for administering
water rights could not function effectively if federal agencies submitted applications but were not bound by permits or conditions.
The argument made by the solicitor general that the United
States may make use of unappropriated waters on federal lands
independent of state law is not strongly supported. The development of western water law and dicta in cases for over one hundred
years have supported a state's right to control its own streams. Recently, the two Supreme Court cases, United States v. New Mexico2 5 and California v. United States, "I have both indicated that
Congress has not intended to exercise its constitutional authority
to preempt state water law. It seems unlikely that such a preemption could be brought about by anything less than a clear expression of congressional intent to do so.
222.

438 U.S. 645 (1978).

223.

Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 201, at 9.
224. Two suits were filed in March 1980 in Nevada and Wyoming. The Nevada case
was subsequently withdrawn. See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., Civ. No. D183 BRT (D. Nev., filed Feb. 29, 1980, withdrawn March 20, 1980); In re Bighorn River, No.
4993 (5th Judicial Dist. Wyo., filed Jan. 24, 1977, still in trial).
225. 438 U.S. at 701-02.
226.

438 U.S. at 665-70.
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TOOLS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Statutory Prohibitionon Exportation of Water

Montana has already adopted several statutory tools for protecting the state's water. This section discusses those statutory

tools and comments on the approach which should be developed in
the state water plan.
Montana has a statutory provision which is designed to preserve the waters of the state by prohibiting exportation without
consent from the legislature. 2 7 Although a suit has been filed
which among other issues challenges the constitutionality of this
provision, it is unlikely that any court decision will be forthcoming
in the near future which could decide the constitutionality of the
statute. 2 8 If the statute can be found to be a legitimate exercise of
police power, then the constitutionality will be upheld. More likely,
however, would be a finding that the statute interferes with interstate commerce and is thus unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court has dealt with the constitutionality of
similar statutes in New Jersey 2'

and Texas.3

The New Jersey

statute was held to be constitutional while the Texas statute was
struck down. The more recent Texas case probably represents the
current point of view. Since the New Jersey case was decided in
1908, the application of the Commerce Clause has undergone tremendous growth. This development, more than any other, explains
why the New Jersey statute was upheld while the Texas statute
227. MCA § 85-1-121 (1979) provides:
Out-of-state use of water. None of the waters in the State of Montana shall ever
be appropriated, diverted, impounded, or otherwise restrained or controlled while
within the state for use outside the boundaries thereof, except pursuant to a petition to and an act of the legislature of the State of Montana permitting such
action.
228. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Commission, No. 1184 (D.
Mont., filed June, 1973, amended complaint, Oct., 1980) (the amended complaint does not
attack the anti-exportation statute directly, but argues repeal by implication by virtue of
adoption of the Yellowstone River Compact).
229. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). The statute in this
case provided: "It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to transport or carry,
through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook,
creek, river or stream of this State into any other State, for use therein." 1905 N.J. LAWS,
ch. 238 (current version of statute at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:3-1 (West 1966)).
230. Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), afj'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35
(1966). The statute in this case provided: "No one shall withdraw water from any underground source in this state for use in any other state by drilling a well in Texas and transporting the water outside the boundaries of this state unless the same be specifically authorized by an Act of the Texas Legislature and thereafter approved by it." TEx. Rzv. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 7477b (Vernon Supp. 1965). This statute was ruled unconstitutional in Altus, 255
F. Supp. at 839-40.
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was invalidated.
All western states including Montana have constitutional provisions which claim proprietary ownership to the water in the
state. The Montana Constitution states: "All surface, underground,
flood and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state
are the property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law."23 1 In
support of the anti-exportation statute it could be argued that
since the state holds the water in trust for its citizens, it has a duty
to preserve the resource. In addition, if the state does own the
water then any rights that others obtain can only be gained by the
consent of the state. Under such reasoning, the state might find
that appropriation or diversion out-of-state would not be in the
public interest. The flaw in this argument is that the extent of the
state's power to regulate is defined not by what is claimed in the
state constitution but rather by the Tenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Tenth Amendment does not reserve such expansive powers that would enable a state to claim exclusive right to its waters. The relationship with the rest of the
Union requires that the interests of other states be considered.2 2
Individual states are allowed to regulate activities which have
an effect on interstate commerce as long as that effect is only incidental and the matter regulated is primarily a matter of local concern.2 3- It seems clear that water must be regarded as an article of
commerce. The Court has tended to treat natural resources as
commercial commodities and has found that states may not prohibit interstate transportation of those commodities.2 3' Thus, it
seems hard to avoid the conclusion that such a statute does affect
interstate commerce or at least bear such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that it becomes a matter of national concern. 5
The purpose of an anti-exportation statute is local in scope.
Its intent is to preserve and protect the state's water resources. In
evaluating whether the regulation of this local concern unduly burdens interstate commerce the Court may consider whether alternative means might be as effective in achieving the intended pur231. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3).
232. See Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO L. REv. 399
(1961); 2 CLARK, supra note 15, at § 102.
233. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
234. Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35
(1966); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
235. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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pose.' 6 Montana statutes already provide substantial protection
against waste and depletion of the state's water resources. Initial
appropriation, change of use or diversion point, and the sale of a
water right all require approval of the Department of Natural Resources.2 37 Additional statutes prohibit waste and provide mechanisms for limiting withdrawals if necessary. 3 Montana law even
specifically excludes slurry pipelines from being considered a beneficial use.23 9 The Court would most likely find that the anti-exportation statute serves no purpose which is not also achievable by
alternate means which do not place a burden on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court recently confirmed that a state may
not impose the full costs of "conserving" its resources on those
outside the state. 4 0
It is highly probable that if the constitutionality of the Montana anti-exportation statute is tested that the law will be found to
constitute an unreasonable burden on and to discriminate against
interstate commerce. The statute is specifically directed at any
out-of-state uses of Montana water. A more appropriate approach
might be to prohibit those wasteful or inefficient uses of water
whether they be in-state or out-of-state. The fact that existing
statutes do take such an approach only further confirms the discriminatory character of the statute. The fact that, at least technically, the statute is not an outright prohibition does not help legitimize the statute itself.' 1 The discriminatory character of the
statute can be seen in the requirement of legislative approval only
for out-of-state users. Since the whole basis of the statute is the
out-of-state character of a proposed use rather than the type of use
itself, the statute would be unlikely to pass a test of its
constitutionality.
B.

The Reservation Process

The reservation of waters permitted by statute"2 in Montana
has been discussed at various points throughout this article. That
236. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
237. MCA §§ 85-2-201 through -520 (1979).
238. MCA §§ 85-2-412, -505, -507 (1979).
239. MCA § 85-2-104 (1979): "(1) The legislature finds that the use of water for the
slurry transport of coal is detrimental to the conservation and protection of the water resources of this state. (2) The use of water for the slurry transport of coal is not a beneficial
use of water."
240. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
241. This statute prohibits exportation without consent of the legislature. MCA § 851-121 (1979).
242. MCA § 85-2-316(6) (1979).
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statute allows any governmental entity to reserve waters for future
beneficial uses including instream flow, when properly approved by
the Board of Natural Resources. This section of the article attempts to assess the legal status of those reservations. There is no
case law so an examination of the weight to be given to a reservation is conjectural.
In Montana, a reservation right is equivalent to a duly perfected permit right. The reservation receives a priority as of the
date the order is adopted by the board 2 4a Potential interference
with reserved waters is a basis for denying a later permit just as if
it were interference with a prior permit right.2 44 Although a reservation of water is distinctly different from a permit right, it is accorded equal status in Montana.
Outside the state the effect of a reservation is not so clear. As
discussed earlier in the section on interstate allocation, crossing
the state boundary results in a softening of strict appropriative
water laws. The Supreme Court has used the appropriation doctrine and accompanying priority dates as a "guilding principle" but
has refused to be bound by strict priority in allocating interstate
waters. In equitable apportionment the key factor becomes not
priority dates but "established uses." It is important to decide
whether a reservation might be considered an "established use."
The answer seems to be a resounding "maybe."
The crucial factor in determining whether a reservation is an
established use lies in the operation of the reservation process. In
all likelihood, if it is administered judiciously, a reservation of
waters will be considered an established use or at least close to it.
The reservation process is a mechanism of great flexibility which
can be an effective planning tool. If a reservation reflects a legitimate foreseeable need, and progress is being made toward that objective, then the reservation should be respected. However, inherent in the reservation process is also great potential for abuse. If
the reservation process is used merely to stake a claim and extend
Montana's rights over its waters, the reservation process is not
likely to be recognized by the Court. The process must bear some
rational relationship to the development of the state's water resources or it will be considered a sham, as well as becoming vulnerable to constitutional attack.
There are pressures that prevent the process from being
abused. Many critics of the process claim Montana is harmed by
243.
244.

Id.
MCA §§ 85-2-311(5), -316(5) (1979).
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guaranteeing flow to downstream neighbors who can then develop
established uses of that water. That is one effect of the reservation
process. This situation should tend to keep reservations limited to
legitimate needs. The pressure to limit reservations would seem to
strengthen the argument that reservations are established uses.
The state would be unwilling to over-reserve, since to do so would
actually benefit those states downstream. This pressure would tend
to preserve the legitimacy of the reservation process since it would
not be in the state's best interest to use reservations of water for
improper purposes.
Reservations seem to be an even stronger tool for protecting
the state's water in conflicts with the federal government. As discussed earlier, since the role of state law in defining property interests is secure, the best leverage can be gained in dealings with the
federal government by defining those property interests as broadly
as possible. Montana law considers a reservation to be of the same
stature as a duly perfected permit right, so a reservation should be
treated as a property right also, as long as the reservation process
is not applied indiscriminately.
V.

CONCLUSION

Through an examination of the relevant case law this article
has examined the interstate and federal-state factors which should
be addressed by a state water plan. The most obvious conclusion
that can be drawn is that there is no simple way to save Montana
water for Montanans. The water cannot just be dammed up at the
border and retained for use within the state. There is no way to
make a claim to all the state's water which would be effective
against claims by other states and the federal government.
In equitable apportionment, the Supreme Court considers "established uses" and an "equality of right" to the benefits of an
interstate stream. In compact negotiations the most effective bargaining tool is to have a realistic appraisal of the state's future
needs and plans for developing that needed water. If interstate waters are apportioned by Congress then effective representation and
strong lobbies are the state's best tools.
In dealings with the federal government there is little the state
can do to counter federal power, but Congress has demonstrated a
tradition of protecting state control of water. Strong political leadership can help to maintain that deference to state water law. With
or without a favorable congressional attitude, the state can better
its position through continued and increased recognition of property rights in water.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1981

47

314

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 42 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 4

[Vol. 42

The reservation process represents one of the strongest and
most flexible tools that Montana may use to protect its water.
Used judiciously, the process will prove invaluable in protecting
Montana's water and in developing a state water plan.
None of these areas suggest a simple way to retain the state's
water. Instead, they indicate that the best protection for Montana's water is a sound management plan. If the extent of the resource and the future needs of the state can be accurately ascertained, a solid plan for development can be designed. A
comprehensive and realistic plan will go far toward insuring that
Montana has sufficient water for its future development.
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